Medicaid managed care initiatives that relied heavily on capitated risk-based managed care. They also include three of the five States nationwide-Tennessee, Oregon, and Maryland-that have 75 percent or more of their Supplemental Security Income (SSI) population in capitated managed care. Each of the three includes a behavioral health component and does so with a different model, which adds richness to our comparative analysis.
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
The Medicaid program is the major way health insurance is provided for those under age 65 who are not eligible for or cannot afford private insurance under our employ ment-based system (Altman, Reinhardt, and Shields, 1998) . Over time, the Medicaid program has become increasingly complex as both Federal and State policymakers have turned to it to address particular gaps in insurance eligibility and coverage, to use Medicaid's financing (shared by the Federal Government and States) to stretch State funds by obtaining a Medicaid match for services previously covered solely with State dollars (like care for the chronically mentally ill), and to meet important other social objectives (Coughlin et al., 1999) . This includes care for the uninsured who would not otherwise qualify for Medicaid, support for services for children with special needs, and funding for both safety net providers and those focused on services that typically are public responsibilities, like the care for the chronically mentally ill. Such funding strategies have been termed "Medicaid maximization," in the sense that States have an incentive to max imize the amount of Federal Medicaid funds obtained and used them to limit State obligations. The use of these arrange ments makes Medicaid relatively unique among insurance programs, though some cross-subsidies exist in all programs, espe cially public ones. In Medicaid, these financing arrangements lead to key con stituencies, such specialized mental health, rehabilitation and safety net providers con sidering these funds as "theirs." Further, as States bring more benefits and popula tions into managed care, it inevitably cre ates bureaucratic conflicts between Medicaid and other agencies and make coordination more difficult (Smith, 1999) .
In this article, we examine State experi ence and use it to show how the complex structure of the Medicaid program creates relatively unique challenges and conflicts that often are not fully anticipated when States seek to move to Medicaid managed care. The "rules" policymakers develop for Medicaid managed care accommodate Medicaid's complexity and aim to recon cile competing goals. Further, capitation by its very nature inherently has the poten tial to redistribute funds because it changes the locus of authority and risk for spending. This means policymakers need to anticipate the conflicts and issues that will arise and how their resolution will influence and shape the inevitable tradeoffs and distribution of benefits and costs that accrue in introducing Medicaid managed care.
Anticipating such issues is more impor tant now than ever, as States extend managed care programs beyond the traditional focus on low income families and children to other Medicaid program eligibles Draper, 1998a and 1998b.) These subgroups may include, for exam ple, individuals with physical disabilities, the severely and persistently mentally ill (SPMI), those who are mentally retarded or developmentally disabled, individuals with human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), and others. Managed care programs that include one or more of these subgroups are increasingly preva lent. Recent data show, for example, that 27 percent of Medicaid individuals under age 65 with disabilities are in managed care, two-thirds in capitated programs (Regenstein and Schorer, 1998) .
The policy challenges are particularly well illustrated by behavioral health ser vices (mental health and chemical depen dency) and thus it is used as an example for many of the points of this article. Medicaid does not cover inpatient care in mental health facilities for adults under age 65 and States historically have supported this system using a diverse set of State and Federal grant programs and increasingly fee-for-service (FFS) Medicaid payments (Grob, 1994) . Behavioral health accounts for 10.3 percent of Medicaid spending and 21.6 percent of non-Medicaid State and local government spending for personal health care services (McKusick, et al., 1998) .
STUDY METHODS
We selected the seven States we studied to provide a broad geographic mix from among States pursuing mandator y Medicaid managed care with an emphasis on capitated systems and broad-based implementation. Each State was studied in a week-long site visit that involved interviews with health plans, providers, and beneficiary groups in several communities, as well as State officials and other stakeholders statewide. (Only in Minnesota was the study more limited in that it was based on telephone interviews with State offi cials.) The visits occurred between late 1997 and early 1999. Topics included the history and design of the Medicaid managed care initiative, the experience under it and the particular design and operational issues associated with covering those on SSI or with extensive need for care (like the chronically mentally ill). The latter are the focus of most of this article. In addition to the interviews, we also reviewed perti nent documents, administrative data, and reports. We also visited all the States but Maryland earlier (between 1994 and 1996) .
FINDINGS

Medicaid Managed Care is Particularly Complex
When setting up mandatory Medicaid managed care programs like those we studied, States need to decide whom to include and how to integrate Medicaid's diverse health benefits under the managed care structure (Bachman and Burwell, 1998) . Under a mandatory system, States specify operationally which populations must enroll; others are "car ved-out," remaining either in traditional FFS or steered to a specialized managed care plan built around their needs. The State contract with managed care plans specifies which benefits managed care plans are responsible for providing; Medicaid benefi ciaries remain eligible for other covered benefits but the State covers them under traditional FFS arrangements or through specialized managed care programs specif ic to that benefit. Table 1 summarizes the main features of each program we studied including the statutory authority, geographic scope, the nature of basic (regular) managed care options, the Medicaid-eligible individuals excluded from these basic options, and the way in which selected specific benefits and populations subgroups are handled. Medicaid managed care programs vary enormously but can be considered to fall into two classes: "traditional" programs that limit mandatory managed care enroll ment for the most part to low-income fami lies and children, excluding those with spe cial needs; and "comprehensive" programs that include as broad a cross-section of the Medicaid population as possible in managed care. Among States we studied, California's two-plan model, 1 and the programs in Minnesota and Texas are tradi tional Medicaid managed care programs. Each excludes SSI eligible persons and has various other exclusions. Florida started as a traditional program that still has many exclusions but recently mandated managed care enrollment for the SSI popula tion with a choice between health mainte nance organization (HMO) and primary care case management. In contrast, California's county-organized health sys tem, 2 and the programs in Maryland, Oregon, and Tennessee are more compre hensive programs that include at least nonMedicare-covered SSI eligible individuals. All but Orange County also aim to address specialized behavioral health care needs, including needs of those with SPMI. Managed care plans and providers more accustomed to commercial programs may be unaware of the dimensions of this com plexity and how State policy influences both delivery and financial requirements. The fact that programs that are seemingly similar from the outside often differ in less visible ways also complicates cross-State comparisons. This means judgment and experience are important in deciding how best to interpret State experience both within a State and for other States.
Historical Cross-Subsidies and Funding are Threatened
Medicaid managed care that includes SSI eligible individuals raises a host of rel atively unique issues that affect State-spon sored services for those with severe men tal illness or chemical dependency. The public sector plays a more dominant role in financing the treatment of mental illness and chemical dependency than other health care, especially for those with the most severe needs (Mechanic, Schleshinger, and McAlpine, 1995) . Many States make extensive use of the Federal match on State Medicaid funds to help pay for these services. Capitation has the potential to disrupt the flow of these Medicaid funds because capitation, by its nature, aggregates funds used by enrollees and authorizes a health plan to manage these dollars on an at-risk basis. To the extent that capitation includes funds for benefits and payments to providers, it, therefore, gives those providers less direct control over the funds than if the funds come directly to the provider from the State in either FFS or capitation payments. Further, State mental health systems his torically have evolved separately from those of alcohol and drug services which means that, in moving to Medicaid managed care, States need to coordinate with at least two and often three or more sepa rate State agencies, each with their own set of objectives and specialized constituent providers who often are heavily dependent on the flow of Medicaid and State-directed funding.
The fiscal implications of Medicaid managed care are particularly critical for men tal health services. State services have his torically taken the form of residentially based care for those with SPMI which means they often involve State-owned "bricks and mortar" staffed by State workers (Grob, 1994) . While Medicaid funds can be used only for children and for adults over age 65 in traditional mental institu tions, Medicaid helps finance emergency and acute care for those with SPMI as well as an increasing array of less institutional settings. States also have become increas ingly involved in community-based service delivery financed in part with Federal block grant funding that States may match with the State share of Medicaid funds. In many States, the dual focus on residential and community-based care means that two, and at times relatively independent, sys tems have evolved-one that consists of community care for the entire population and another that consists essentially of care, often in State mental institutions, for individuals with SPMI. These two systems may have their own, often conflicting, objectives and separate sets of providers and constituent concerns that complicate the design of mental health components of Medicaid managed care.
The State role in chemical dependency is less resource intensive and more outpa tient based than with mental health care. Treatment often is more short term and community based. County systems may be complemented by a host of grant-contract ed providers. Though Federal funds for these alcohol and drug abuse services (as well as mental health) have now been com bined into a single block grant (Jacobsen and McGuire, 1996) , many States continue to operate alcohol services separate from drug abuse services and the interests of these two constituencies may diverge.
Reconciling Objectives is Challenging
The complex funding streams and multi plicity of involved stakeholders just described factor heavily into the chal lenges of developing Medicaid managed care when it includes those with extensive needs for behavioral services. Maryland, Oregon, and Tennessee all found that designing the "behavioral health compo nents" of their comprehensive Medicaid managed care initiatives was challenging because of the wide range of service and providers involved in care for these indi viduals (Gold, Mittler, and Lyons, 1999; Mittler and Gold, 1999; and Aizer and Gold, 1999) . Maryland-In Maryland, the regular Medicaid HMO plans are responsible for chemical dependency and primary mental 3 Individuals also select a dental health organization.
health care, but all other mental health ser vices are provided through a system direct ed by the Mental Hygiene Administration (MHA). This structure also reflects a com promise. State officials originally proposed to exclude individuals with SPMI from HealthChoice, Maryland's managed care program, and to cover the behavioral health care needs of others on an integrat ed basis through the managed care plan. We were told by staff of the MHA that the legislature ultimately decided to shift from a population exclusion to a service carveout in response to public hearings in which advocates for the mentally ill argued that a population exclusion would be stigmatiz ing. The benefit carveout was restricted to mental health because chemical dependen cy providers were concerned that they would suffer in a combined carveout. The legislature also authorized inclusion of "primary mental health" in mainstream managed care benefits. Primary mental health services are defined as services viewed by a primary care physician as being within the scope of his or her prac tice. For example, these services might include prescribing anti-depressants for post-partum depression or limited counsel ing in the course of a visit. However, in reality, the capitation rate to HMOs excludes costs for all visits with a mental health diagnosis, so the HMOs are paid only a limited amount (some pharmaceuti cal costs) to support the delivery of prima ry mental health care.
Maryland's managed mental health ini tiative-Mar yland HealthPartners-cov ers Medicaid beneficiaries and others who are income or otherwise eligible for Statesupported services. The system is funded by a mix of Medicaid funds, MHA grant funds, and selected other sources. Maryland HealthPartners operates as a joint venture by the Maryland's MHA, which is responsible for the program, and two private behavioral health firms (GreenSpring Health Services and CMG Health) selected by competitive procure ment to help operate the program. The State "owns" the provider network, and the firms are paid a fee for network adminis tration, claims processing, and utilization management.
The provider network includes local mental health centers and private vendors of both community-based and institutional ser vices that can be accessed through a centralized intake process by self-referral or by referral from a regular Medicaid managed care provider. Core service agencies are responsible for planning and monitoring the program at the local level. Reportedly, provider capac ity has increased five-or six-fold since the program began. MHA receives an aggre gate payment that was originally calculated on the basis of estimated prior Medicaid costs for covered benefits (including administration but less the State's 10 percent mandated savings). While the MHA is technically at risk, the system operates on a FFS model. This form of payment is new for many providers who were once grant funded.
Tennessee-TennCare-Tennessee's Medicaid managed care program-initially integrated behavioral health into the bene fit package for managed care. Care for adults and children with SPMI was exclud ed and continued to be paid for on a FFS basis. TennCare Partners (implemented in 1996) changed this, as the State pooled all Medicaid and State-only funded behavioral health care resources and contracted on a capitated basis with two statewide behav ioral health firms that were forced mergers of the five organizations initially selected for the program. The State was motivated to push the mergers by a desire to limit administrative load. The two behavioral health organizations (BHOs) are assigned to individual managed care plans in TennCare, with a deliberate 60/40 split of covered lives between them. When benefi ciaries enroll in a TennCare managed care plan, they are automatically enrolled in the associated BHO.
Under TennCare Partners, two benefit levels are defined: one for adults and chil dren with SPMI who had previously been served through the State system, and the other for all other TennCare beneficiaries. County mental health centers are charged with certifying eligibility for priority bene fits. Separate capitation rates were set from the beginning for the two sets of indi viduals. In its second year of operation, TennCare Partners modified the rate method in order to impose an aggregate total limit on State spending by reducing capitation rates for those receiving basic benefits if the number of certified priority members exceeds projections. The program realigned funds and organizations very rapidly. Systems were not well devel oped. We heard of instances where they seemed to make it hard to get needed care (e.g., authorization for police to admit in emergencies, overnight stays for those at risk for suicide). All agree there are seri ous problems. Various modification have been made (e.g., an FFS carveout of phar macy benefit costs in the BHO package) or are under consideration (e.g., changes in assessment tools, a single benefit package and rating methods, new forms of adminis tration and oversight).
Competing Objectives and Compromises Shape Programs
Political considerations strongly influ enced program design in each State though the political dynamics and outcomes varied substantially from one State to the next. In all three States, mental health concerns drove the development and form of the "carveout" for specialized managed care. Mental health and chemi cal dependency interests typically diverged, with chemical dependency providers seeming to prefer a role in shap ing Medicaid managed care and its requirements to battling mental health constituencies for control over separate carveouts. The structure of each State's initiative represented a distinct political compromise between the two.
Oregon's final structure can be viewed as a Medicaid managed care model, adapt ed to offer some additional safety net pro tection for county providers. Thus, while the program includes a separately con tracted and specialized mental health ben efit carveout, the program is acute-care focused, built on the more traditional managed care model and limited to those cov ered under the OHP. While counties would have preferred a more separate and coun ty-controlled system, politics seemed to favor the OHP philosophy, making the important concession to initially delay implementation pending a demonstration and, in contracting with plans, giving some preference to traditional providers in order to sustain the flow of revenue to them.
In contrast to Oregon, Maryland's evolu tion toward a mental health model was dri ven by concerns of mental health advo cates and providers seeking control over Medicaid revenues. Their goal was to build a better and more integrated mental health system that would ser ve both Medicaid and State-funded individuals. With a well organized constituency and the leverage afforded by the threat of stigmati zation, Maryland's mental health commu nity gained support for a structure that gave it relative control over about twice as much revenue as before managed care: MHA continued its $100 million in funding for State facilities and $200 million in grant funding, and it gained control over $300 Under TennCare Partners, BHOs are obligated to contract with all the community mental health facilities and the regional mental health facilities in the State. The contracts specify the amount of the per diem payment to the latter. The intent was to convert the open-ended program to a capped entitlement by the offsets built into the process of ratesetting using a two-level benefit package. In year 2, Tennessee struc tured payment by using a "floating capita tion rate" for basic benefits. While the rate for SPMI was set in advance, the rate for those receiving basic benefits was adjusted retroactively so that total spending would not be exceeded if the number of SPMI members receiving priority benefits exceed ed projections. This and other TennCare provisions were controversial for the BHOs. The BHOs set up under TennCare Partners also had operational weaknesses that result ed in substantial adverse publicity. However, while some changes have been made and others proposed, the basic struc ture of TennCare Partners remains intact.
Moving to a capitated managed care model can thus be expected to heighten the tension between competing interests in a State. Maryland's HealthPartners program, for example, has the potential to considerably improve the delivery of men tal health services in the State. But if this means that more Medicaid funds are devoted to mental health, it could also mean that fewer funds are available for other services or for expanding Medicaid eligibility, since State legislatures typically seek to control the rate of growth of Medicaid spending and make program cuts if costs exceed projections.
Complex Systems Generate Extensive Operational Demands
In moving to managed care models that include behavioral health services, States need to anticipate the expanded scope of often specialized providers as well as a diverse set of State agencies that oversee State programs for behavioral health, all of which make cross-agency communication and care coordination very important.
Medicaid policymakers that take coor dination seriously will find that there are many more entities that have to be con sulted when SSI beneficiaries are integrat ed into Medicaid managed care, and that the number grows particularly large when behavioral health is targeted. In Oregon, for example, the Office for Medical Assistance Programs is ultimately respon sible for overseeing all Medicaid managed care. However, the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Ser vices Division handles virtually all the oversight and coordination for mental health, includ ing contract compliance, monitoring, and evaluation. Under this also falls the design of the initial pilot demonstration involving Medicaid managed care for mental health and the development of a quality manage ment guide and standards for the mental health managed care program. Chemical dependency is included in the regular ben efit package, but the Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Programs (OADAP) is active in educating plans about the system. OADAP also developed screening tools for physician use, established criteria for inpa tient care, and developed specific contract standards. The Senior and Disabled Services Division also was actively con sulted on policy for SSI eligible persons more generally.
Specialized providers often are not expe rienced in Medicaid or managed care. Maryland HealthPartners, for example, found that shifting from a grant to an FFS oriented system required extensive startup efforts and training for providers who historically had little experience with billing or operating under this form of rev enue stream, creating different incentives from those that exist with grants. Grants are front ended for fixed amounts, for example, whereas FFS payments vary with volume and require service docu ments. Under grants, providers may be accustomed to managing priorities or excess demands through capacity con straints on service volume. They may not have the infrastructure needed to manage care more comprehensively for defined populations of individuals (i.e. enrollees), as they are required to do under capitation contracts and Medicaid's entitlement. In Oregon, where some county mental health systems serve as MHOs, it is not clear whether county or State officials associat ed with the mental health program fully appreciate the conceptual differences between delivering care on a risk basis to a defined population and serving a target population with grant funds. Thus, while the shift in payment has potential to increase revenue flow it also is risky for providers unaccustomed to relying solely on such revenue alone and those without the systems to handle capitation well.
Compromises may not Align with Patient Needs
At least in theory, capitated Medicaid managed care has the potential to be a tool policymakers can use to improve access, better organize care, and increase accountability for performance. All the States we studied believe that they had fragmented services and limited capacity before managed care was introduced, and that managed care could address these weakness es. Risk-based managed care also more directly ties payment to a specific benefit package and individual. Strong State lead ership can use the incentives of risk-based payment to move program managers beyond competing institutional concerns to a focus on encouraging more coordinat ed care for residents in the State. There are, however, serious challenges that States seeking to do so will confront.
Behavioral health carveouts are attrac tive compromises for conflicting State objectives. But many individuals have both medical and behavioral health needs, the latter including both mental health and chemical dependency. In all three States, coordination across separate systems for medical and behavioral health care created problems for people. In two (Maryland and Oregon), there was the further chal lenge of coordinated mental health (the carveout) with chemical dependency (not carved out). Maryland also had to coordi nate "primar y" and specialized mental health services.
But State policy, even within a carveout, will influence how easy it is to coordinate care for people. Designing financial incen tives to encourage rather than discourage coordination is important. Tennessee's structure illustrates the problems that arise when incentives are poorly aligned. By capitating both managed care and behavioral health care, Tennessee created competing incentives since it is not always clear which system was at risk, and each had an incentive to argue that it was the other. This made coordination of care dif ficult, with difficulties particularly apparent in the area of pharmaceutical management of psychotropic drugs.
TennCare Partners also forced the merger into two BHOs of firms that competed with each other in other lines of business.
TennCare Partners also created HMO-BHO pairs, and similarly, some of the pairings had conflicting financial interests. All of these con flicts served as disincentives to share informa tion on treatment and coordinate care.
The potential for conflict can be lessened by making incentives compatible with, rather than in opposition to, each other. For example, Oregon's decision to retain fiscal responsibility for psychotropic phar maceutical payments and to allow providers in both systems to prescribe them lessened the strong conflict that would otherwise have existed because both HMOs and MHOs were capitated. (In 1998, Tennessee shifted to a similar policy for behavioral pharmaceuticals previously included in the BHO capitation rate.) Maryland's policy of including "primary mental health" benefits in the managed care capitation rate created an incentive for primary care physicians to refer patients needing costly long-term pharmaceutical management to specialists affiliated with Maryland HealthPartners, since this would mean the pharmaceutical costs would be paid for by Maryland HealthPartners. MHA officials said that they preferred this kind of incentive because it encouraged oversight over psy chotropic drugs by psychiatrists. And the system appears to be financed well enough and to have sufficient provider capacity so that access has not, at least in the initial year, appeared to be an issue.
States also can encourage development of shared care protocols to facilitate coordi nation. Provider protocols for managing care that affects providers in both systems are one such tool. These protocols specify how care is to be delivered and responsibil ities divided when both systems are affect ed. Both Oregon and Tennessee took this approach, though State leadership for the protocol-development process was much more extensive in Oregon than Tennessee.
In Oregon, the development of such pro tocols was guided by State officials who involved medical directors from both HMOs and MHOs. Tennessee required such protocols to be developed but left it to the BHOs to develop them. One of the BHOs had more success than the other at this, and in both cases, implementation was limited.
Other tools involve organizational mech anisms that encourage provider-toprovider coordination across systems for related care. Maryland HealthPartners has prepared a video and convened meet ings with primary care physicians to orient them to its operations and to encourage appropriate referral. Maryland also plans a provider cross-walk that will identify providers from both systems who practice together. However, there are operational constraints that may limit their success. For example, while the State prepares a central directory of providers that includes data from all HMOs, it has found it difficult to get an accurate and current, consolidat ed listing, since contracts change and providers practice under different organi zational names and in multiple sites, not all with the same affiliation. In Oregon, direct provider-to-provider coordination has been encouraged by partnerships that have developed between some of the medical and mental health organizations, as a result of a series of interlocking subcontracts. Such joint involvement of providers in each system appears to be valuable because it provides flexibility to tailor care to the diverse behavioral health care needs of Medicaid beneficiaries. It also erases the historical separation between providers with more expertise in caring for individu als with SPMI and those with expertise treating others with less chronic or severe needs.
Coordination Barriers: System Limitations and Privacy
State experience also highlights barriers to coordination. One major barrier is the need to maintain confidentiality and patient privacy, a particularly sensitive issue for those with behavioral health care needs. Coordination requires that information be shared among providers, but this sharing may not be possible across systems because of the rules each system uses to ensure confidentiality. Fragmented man agement systems are another barrier to coordination between systems: many States have different program-specific data sys tems that can't "talk to each other" as well as difficulties in generating encounter data which might allow them to surmount exist ing data constraints. Both privacy concerns and data constraints, for example, contribute to difficulties in monitoring adverse pharmaceutical interactions when individu als fill prescriptions in multiple systems.
The interest in managed care to promote better service to individuals leads to inter est in performance data that can help assess change. But a big barrier is that there exist conflicting views on appropriate treatment and setting. In Maryland, for example, including treatment for chemical dependency under HMOs has sparked debate about whether access to these ser vices has been eroded. Advocates perceive that HMOs are under-treating these condi tions. But others speculate that part of the problem may be due to HMOs using providers not traditionally involved in the public system, and to care that is provided but not documented (or necessarily reim bursed). With each set of providers and managed care entities coming from a dif ferent base of experience, conflicts are more likely and mean that it can be harder to reach agreement on what care should be provided.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis shows that Medicaid is a highly complex program with objectives that extend far beyond its role as an insur ance financing system for low-income indi viduals. Over time, Federal matching funds, together with the limitations in other funding streams, have encouraged States to use Medicaid to cover individuals and replace and expand what previously may have been 100 percent State-funded services for residents with complex and expensive needs that would not likely be met by private insurance (even if it were available). This expansion of Medicaid has, in many cases, prompted the develop ment of specialized provider systems that depend upon Medicaid revenue and Medicaid patients. Medicaid managed care has the potential to increase the focus through capitation on the Medicaid patient as a whole, but it also threatens existing systems and providers that have depended on Medicaid revenue and may use it to cover the costs of other services. These issues become particularly visible when States mandate managed care for those covered by SSI, and they become even more visible when they affect care for the SPMI individuals, who account for a dis proportionate share of both Medicaid spending and independent State spending on health care.
The systems that result are not neces sarily optimally configured to meet the needs of Medicaid's diverse population, though neither is care under the tradition al FFS model. The experience of the States in our study is that carveouts can allow specialization, but they also invariably make coordinating care a problem for peo ple who have multiple ser vice needs. Population exclusions are less affected by this problem but they may be less acceptable to advocates who fear stigma. States choosing a service-carveout option can benefit by careful planning, developing shared protocols for providers in different systems, and creating systems that have compatible, rather than competing, incen tives that encourage appropriate care and coordination. The study States provide good illustrations of both more and less effective ways of doing this.
A key shortcoming, no matter what the approach, is that systems that include carveouts typically retain some degree of fragmentation which conflicts with more integrated needs of people. Compared with FFS, risk-based managed care can create incentives to better organize ser vices to maintain health and functioning for severely ill individuals, some of whom may now be served by fragmented and inade quate systems of care. But policymakers need to consciously reinforce this goal, since there are many reasons why coordi nation is hard to achieve. And policymak ers also would be well advised to keep their expectations down since it is highly unlike ly that managed care will be able to achieve a level of coordination and communication State governments themselves may never have been able to achieve.
In sum, our analysis indicates that State policymakers would be wise to assume that the push toward Medicaid managed care will make more prominent the competition between diverse State objectives that influ ence how Medicaid is viewed. These inter ested parties are substantially broader than under commercial managed care and even for Medicaid managed care when focused on low-income families. Policymakers clearly have a choice about the type of Medicaid managed care program to implement. Our analysis suggests that they are well-advised to be strategic about that choice and encourage systems that both anticipate the complex operational challenges and seek to shape them in ways that take into account the ultimate impact on the people they are to serve.
